THE COMPANY-BUILDING FIELD NOTEBOOKRESEARCH EDITION / SEPTEMBER 2026
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COMPANY CASES / Failures and Frauds

Theranos and Nikola: the two shapes of startup fraud

These belong together because they illustrate the same mechanism with different physics.

Theranos (Elizabeth Holmes, founded 2003) claimed its "Edison" device could run hundreds of diagnostic tests from a finger-prick of blood. It raised roughly $700M at a $9B valuation from investors including Rupert Murdoch, the Walton family, Betsy DeVos and Carlos Slim, with a board of former Secretaries of State and Defense and no diagnostics expertise. In reality the company ran most tests on modified commercial analyzers and produced unreliable patient results — a fact established by John Carreyrou's 2015 Wall Street Journal investigation and then by regulators and courts. Holmes was convicted on four counts of wire fraud and conspiracy in January 2022 and sentenced to 11 years and three months; Ramesh "Sunny" Balwani was convicted on twelve counts and sentenced to nearly 13 years. Holmes reported to prison in May 2023; her sentence has since been reduced modestly for good conduct and she remains incarcerated as of 2026.

Nikola (Trevor Milton, founded 2014) claimed working hydrogen fuel-cell semi trucks. The pivotal fact, exposed by Hindenburg Research in September 2020, was that the promotional video of the "Nikola One in motion" showed a truck rolling down a hill under gravity. Nikola had gone public via SPAC in June 2020 and briefly exceeded Ford's market capitalization. Milton was convicted of securities and wire fraud in October 2022 and sentenced to four years in December 2023. Nikola filed for Chapter 11 in February 2025, and Lucid acquired its Arizona facility and hired some staff in 2025. In March 2025, President Trump pardoned Trevor Milton (CNBC, March 2025) — after which Milton asserted the pardon in a dispute over a $69M claim in the bankruptcy (TechCrunch, April 2025).

The shared mechanism. Both companies raised on demonstrations rather than data, in domains where investors could not evaluate the claim themselves, with governance structures that made verification nobody's job. Theranos investors were not life-sciences investors; Nikola's SPAC route bypassed the IPO diligence process entirely and — critically — SPACs at the time permitted forward-looking projections that traditional IPOs did not.

Lessons.

  1. The fraud risk is highest where the claim is hardest for the funder to verify and the prestige of the room is highest. Both boards were impressive and technically useless.
  2. "Fake it till you make it" is a description of securities fraud when you are raising money on it. The line is not blurry: the question is whether a reasonable investor would have acted differently knowing the truth.
  3. Enforcement is not a constant. One founder is in prison; the other was pardoned. Do not model legal consequence as a reliable deterrent or as a reliable fate.

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